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ABSTRACT
In this paper I criticize Alison Jaggar’s descriptions of feminist political theories. I propose an
alternative classification of feminist theories that I think more accurately reflects the multiplica-
tion of feminist theories and philosophies. There are two main categories, “street theory” and
academic theories, each with two sub-divisions, political spectrum and “differences” under street
theory, and directly and indirectly political analyses under academic theories. My view explains
why there are no radical feminists outside of North America and why there are so few socialist
feminists inside North America. I argue, controversially, that radical feminism is a radical version
of liberalism. I argue that “difference” feminist theories – theory by and about feminists of colour,
queer feminists, feminists with disabilities and so on – belong in a separate sub-category of street
theory, because they’ve had profound effects on feminist activism not tracked by traditional left-
to-right classifications. Finally, I argue that, while academic feminist theories such as feminist
existentialism or feminist sociological theory are generally unconnected to movement activism,
they provide important feminist insights that may become important to activists later. I conclude
by showing the advantages of my classification over Jaggar’s views.
RÉSUMÉ
Une analyse critique de la description des théories politiques féministes révèle qu’une classifica-
tion alternative à celle de Jaggar permettrait de répertorier plus adéquatement les différents cou-
rants féministes qui ont évolués au cours des dernières décennies. La nouvelle cartographie que
nous proposons comprend deux familles de féminisme : activiste et académique. Cette nouvelle
manière de localiser et situer les féminismes aide à comprendre pourquoi il n’y a pas de fémi-
nisme radical à l’extérieur de l’Amérique du Nord et aussi pourquoi il y a si peu de féministes
socialistes en Amérique du Nord. Dans ce nouveau schème, le féminisme de la «différence» devient
une sous-catégorie du féminisme activiste car ce courant a eu une influence importante sur le
féminisme activiste. Même si les courants de féminisme académique n’ont pas de rapports directs
avec les mouvements activistes, ils jouent un rôle important dans l’énonciation et l’élaboration
de certaines problématiques qui, ensuite, peuvent s’avérer cruciales pour les activistes. Nous
concluons en démontrant que cette nouvelle classification représente plus clairement les diffé-
rents féminismes et facilite la compréhension de l’évolution du féminisme et des enjeux qui ont
influencé le féminisme.
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Alison Jaggar’s 1977 paper “Political Philosophies of Women’s
Liberation” has had an enormous impact on English-speaking femi-
nist philosophy. In it, Jaggar laid out three feminist positions which
were represented in the feminist movement in the 1970s: liberal fem-
inism, classical Marxist feminism and radical feminism, plus two
developing positions, lesbian separatism and socialist feminism.1
Liberal feminists, according to Jaggar, believe in the basic justice of
the liberal state, but they think liberal principles have not been applied
fairly to women. Liberal feminists support goals like paid maternity
leave, equal opportunity in education and employment, reproductive
choice and (at least private) daycare centres. Marxist feminists believe,
along with Engels,2 that the oppression of women results from the
institution of private property, and thus that women’s oppression will
end only when private property is abolished. Women’s goal should be
to become workers, and to fight alongside their brothers to end the
exploitation of labour under capitalism. Radical feminists, Jaggar says,
believe that women’s oppression is “causally and conceptually irre-
ducible to the oppression of any other group.”3 The radical feminist
slogan “the personal is political” – the claim that personal life is
politically structured – expresses radical feminists’ belief that “men
systematically dominate women in every area of life,”4 and thus that
radical (from the Latin radix, “root”) changes in male-female rela-
tions are necessary for women’s liberation. Lesbian separatists argue
that the best response to male supremacy is the creation of a sepa-
rate, matriarchal, society.5 And finally, socialist feminists combine the
best of radical and Marxist feminist analyses, according to Jaggar.
They accept the radical feminist claim that “the personal is political,”
and they accept the Marxist feminist critique of the family under cap-
italism. But they reject what they consider to be radical feminism’s
exclusive focus on the subordination of women under patriarchy and
classical Marxism’s exclusive focus on the exploitation of workers
under capitalism, in favour of a feminist analysis that focuses on the
exploitation of women under capitalist patriarchy.6
Jaggar’s categories have become standard among English-speak-
ing philosophers and other theorists as a way of characterizing fem-
inist theoretical positions, and they have been added to by her and
by others. They now include many forms of feminism in addition to
the initial five: existentialist feminism, postmodern feminism, Black
feminism, multicultural feminism and psychoanalytic feminism,
among others.7
I’ve been somewhat uncomfortable with Jaggar’s descriptions of
the various positions since I first read her paper in the late 1970s.
My initial concern was personal: according to her descriptions, I’m
a socialist feminist. Yet I’ve been a long-time activist in feminist
movements in both the US and Canada, and I know I’m a radical
feminist, not a socialist feminist. I look like a socialist feminist accord-
ing to Jaggar’s descriptions because I’m a socialist as well as a rad-
ical feminist. But many radical feminists are also socialists: Charlotte
Bunch and Robin Morgan were both part of the non-aligned left in
the US (that is, not aligned with particular socialist parties), and
Catharine MacKinnon uses a Marxist methodology in her work.8
Because Jaggar defined socialist feminism as a view that combines
the best of radical feminism and socialism, it appears that any radi-
cal feminist who is also a socialist must be a socialist feminist. Nor
did she distinguish between those whose socialist beliefs are Marxist
and those whose socialist beliefs are non-Marxist, as mine are, along
with many other socialists in the non-aligned left in North America.
What makes me a radical feminist rather than a socialist feminist is
not primarily my non-Marxist socialist beliefs, however. I’m a radi-
cal feminist because, first, I believe that personal and sexual politics
are central to the oppression of women (notice: “central to,” not “the
sole cause of ”), and second, because most of my feminist activism
has been in the violence against women movement. While Jaggar’s
work since her original paper has discussed the importance of sexu-
ality to the radical feminist analysis,9 she seems unaware that vio-
lence against women has been the central focus of radical feminist
analysis and activism since the late 1970s.10
My second concern was geographical: the more I looked, the more
I was puzzled by the fact that virtually no one calls herself a radical
feminist outside of the US and Canada, and virtually no one calls her-
self a socialist feminist inside the US and Canada. I’ve seen the odd
Australian and even British feminist identify as a radical feminist, but
they’re few and far between, and I’ve never seen a non-English-speak-
ing feminist identify as a radical feminist.11 Radical feminism appears
to be (and is recognized by at least some Europeans as) a uniquely
North American phenomenon.12 In the US and Canada socialist femi-
nists are a rare breed, and almost all of them, like the majority of social-
ists in the US and Canada, are academics. Outside of the US and Canada
virtually all feminists are also socialists, so the adjective “socialist” is
redundant and therefore not generally used by activists.13
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My third concern was with the proliferation of feminisms with-
out adequate discussion of their relations to each other. As the vari-
ous feminisms multiplied in the literature, it became increasingly obvi-
ous that a single feminist could hold more than one position: a Black
feminist might be radical politically and might occasionally be a fem-
inist postmodernist (think of bell hooks)14; a socialist feminist might
also be a lesbian feminist who uses feminist psychoanalysis (think of
Monique Wittig or perhaps Luce Irigaray).15 The relations and dis-
tinctions between the categories seemed increasingly muddy as the
forms of feminism proliferated.
In this paper, I propose an alternative classification that I think
more accurately reflects the multiplication of feminist theories and
philosophies. While there are still identifiable liberal, radical and
socialist feminists in the women’s movement today, we need a better
way to reflect the fact that the same feminist often holds several other
compatible theoretical positions. I suggest the following classification:
first, a division of feminist theories into activist and academic theo-
ries, followed by a subdivision of each category – activist theories into
positions along a political spectrum and “differences” feminisms, and
academic theories into directly and indirectly political analyses. Thus
we get the following arrangement of feminist theories:
Jane Mansbridge defines “street theory” as “the fluid and contin-
ually evolving body of meanings that feminists think of when they
ask themselves, ‘Am I a feminist?’ . . . Talking and acting creates
street theory and gives it meaning. Reading keeps one in touch and
continues to make one think.”16 Jaggar’s categories, which map fem-
inist views that “provide the basis for a theory and a practice that
will liberate women,”17 fall under the political spectrum division
which, along with “differences,” comprises the “street theory” cate-
gory. I believe this classification represents activist positions more
accurately than either Jaggar’s division of feminist perspectives along
political lines in Feminist Politics and Human Nature, or Rothenberg’s
and her later classification of feminist theories according to “lenses”
through which to view women’s subordination.18 I agree with Jaggar’s
position in Feminist Politics and Human Nature that what I’m here
calling “differences” feminisms have not developed separate political
theories, but I think they have developed separate forms of feminist
activism, guided by their own feminist perspectives. My classifica-
tion also includes academic feminist theories that Jaggar doesn’t dis-
cuss but which many other feminist theorists and philosophers do,
such as feminist existentialism and feminist postmodernism, as well
as other academic feminist theories such as feminist metaphysics and
feminist science studies that are usually (and unjustifiably, in my view)
left off lists of feminist theories.
These categories aren’t exclusive. While a feminist can only iden-
tify with one of liberal, radical, Marxist or socialist feminisms, she
can identify with as many of the other kinds of feminist theories as
she finds politically useful, personally applicable and/or intellectual-
ly congenial. The different classifications are meant to organize the
proliferation of feminisms in a politically and theoretically defensi-
ble way. As I’ll discuss below, the distinction between street and aca-
demic theories is not always entirely clear-cut, nor is the distinction
between directly and indirectly political analyses. But while the cat-
egories shade into each other, they’re distinct at their cores. In what
follows, I’ll spend most of my time on the two street theory divi-
sions, political spectrum and “differences,” and discuss the academ-
ic classification only briefly.
1. STREET THEORIES
By “street theories” I don’t mean to exclude theories that have
academic status, or theories elaborated and defended by academics.
Street theories are theories that feminists read and appeal to in for-
mulating their goals and practices. A great deal of feminist street the-
ory is written by non-academics, especially from the early part of the
“second wave” of feminism, when many feminist activists were sus-
picious of and even hostile to academics.19 But some feminist activists
10
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are also academics, and some of them write theory that’s used by
other feminist activists. Thus “street theory” refers to the uses to
which a theory is put, not the profession of the theorist.
A. POLITICAL SPECTRUM
The first subdivision of street theories places the theories on two
spectra, a liberal spectrum and a socialist spectrum. I’m not talking
about feminist positions yet, but only the dominant political positions
held by citizens of various countries. In the US and Canada, almost
all the political possibilities are variants of liberalism, ranging from
free-market liberalism to neo-conservatism to social conservatism on
the right, to state capitalism in the centre, and liberal egalitarianism
and democratic socialism on the left. There are genuine socialist or
socialist-like possibilities in the US and Canada (especially the New
Democratic Party in Canada, which has been part of minority gov-
ernments at the federal level, and has led provincial governments in
several provinces). But for complicated historical reasons that I’ll pur-
sue below, Marxist forms of socialism have never caught on in a big
way in either country. Socialist positions in North America tend to
be based on radically egalitarian versions of liberalism.
I’m asserting that socialism is compatible with liberalism. I dis-
tinguish here between socialism as an economic system, like capital-
ism, and Marxism as a political-philosophical system, like liberalism.
All Marxist theories are socialist, but all socialist theories are not
necessarily Marxist. Nor are all liberal theories necessarily capitalist;
there’s nothing within liberalism that’s necessarily incompatible with
socialism. Since liberals claim that everyone is both free and equal,
a liberal can consistently claim that equality is as important as free-
dom, and thus can advocate some (non-Marxist) form of socialism.
Here I’m using “liberal” and “socialist” in their North American rather
than their western European senses. In western Europe, liberalism is
usually understood to entail a particular economic system, capitalism,
and thus is considered to be opposed to socialism; socialists focus
on the fact that their theories are more egalitarian than liberal ones.
In North America, on the other hand, liberalism is usually understood
in its political-philosophical sense and thus is opposed to other polit-
ical-philosophical theories such as Marxism. On this view, liberalism
is compatible with significant redistributions of wealth, including not
only welfare-state liberalism but also forms of socialism that guaran-
tee both liberty and equality.
Political views are more varied and complicated in most of the
rest of the world. In western Europe, the dominant views include vari-
ants of both liberalism and Marxism. There Marxism and other forms
of socialism remain viable political alternatives to liberal capitalism
even since the fall of the Soviet empire. Throw in a smattering of
fascism on the right and Leninism and Trotskyism on the left, and
we have a much broader political spectrum than exists in North
America. What’s important for my purposes, though, is that radical
politics in western Europe since the nineteenth century have mostly
been variants of socialism, particularly Marxism, which speaks to
European history and experience. To be a radical in western Europe
is, almost without exception, to be a socialist. While political situa-
tions are even more complicated outside of western Europe, Marxism
and socialism remain live alternatives in most of the rest of the world,
alongside liberalism, neo-liberalism, and homegrown forms of polit-
ical organizing, especially religious forms. Once again, where they
remain live alternatives, Marxism and socialism tend to occupy the
radical end of the political spectrum in most of the world, whether
on their own or in combination with local political analyses.
Why does no one identify as a radical feminist outside of the US
and Canada? Feminism is, by and large, a radical movement, and
almost everywhere in the world, to be a radical is to be a socialist.
Radical feminism, however, is a politically radical non-socialist view.
Radical feminism is generally recognized as a distinctly North
American form of feminism by feminists outside of North America.
So while there are politically radical feminists on other continents,
they don’t identify as radical feminists because that label has a North
American meaning. Since political radicalism almost always entails
socialism, everyone who would be a radical feminist outside of the
US and Canada just looks like a socialist feminist to us.
Why are there so few socialist and Marxist feminists in the US
and Canada? Because, for complicated historical reasons (in fact, his-
torical materialist reasons), there are hardly any socialists or Marxists
here. Radical politics in the US and Canada are generally variants of
liberalism; most people who would be Marxists or other socialists in
most of the rest of the world are liberals in the US and Canada. Pretty
radical liberals, mind you – I think there’s still radical potential
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remaining in liberalism20 – but not Marxists. Most socialism in North
America is a home-grown form like that of Edward Bellamy and
Charlotte Perkins Gilman in the US21, and the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation (the precursor to the New Democratic
Party) in Canada. These are analogous, I think, to the socialisms of
Robert Owen in Britain and Charles Fourier in France.22 Marx pejo-
ratively described all non-Marxist forms of socialism as “utopian,”
and most contemporary socialists (including Jaggar) appear to
unthinkingly accept the same view. I think a more accurate label, at
least in some cases, would be liberal socialisms. That is, the socialisms
of Bellamy, Gilman, Owen, Fourier, the Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation and much of the non-aligned left in North America start
with the liberal premise that people are, or at least ought to be, free
and equal, but emphasize the egalitarian aspects a great deal more
than most liberals have been wont to, on social as well as econom-
ic fronts. Not only are such views not necessarily utopian, but par-
ties with non-Marxist socialist beliefs form or have formed the gov-
ernments of many countries (especially the Scandinavian countries of
Europe).
Class, that central Marxist category, means a very different thing
in Europe, India and China, for example, than it does in the US or
Canada. In the US and Canada, “class” is pretty nearly identical with
“income”; poor people are working class and the underclass, most
people are middle class (regardless of their relation to the means of
production), and a few very rich people are upper class. In Europe,
class means a lot more than income. There “class” is related to your
history – to your pedigree, to put it crudely. To be upper class is to
be able to trace your ancestry to the lords and ladies, the earls, dukes
and kings of the feudal regimes. Middle class people can trace their
ancestries to the artisans and tradesmen of the feudal regimes, to the
bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie of early industrial capitalism. And
working class people trace their ancestries to the peasants and serfs
of the feudal regimes, to the poor workers of early industrial capital-
ism. Class is even more complicated in South America, Africa and
Asia, where it’s cross-cut by racial divisions, ethnicities, caste and
colonialism. In much of the world, Marxism speaks to those who live
the contradiction between global capitalism’s hollow promise of
expanded spheres of freedom and unequal social positions left over
from feudalism, colonialism and other hierarchical systems.
We can explain the failure of Marxism in the US and Canada in
historical materialist terms – that is, in Marxist terms. According to
Marx, socialism and communism would arise out of industrial capi-
talism, which in turn arose out of feudalism; this was the historical
materialist progression of political economic forms.23 The problem
with this analysis for the US and Canada is that we lack a feudal
past. Britain was already an industrial capitalist country when it col-
onized North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Thus in those countries that lacked pre-existing feudal arrangements
– particularly those countries where Europeans virtually wiped out
the native populations, as they did in the US, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand – capitalism arose in different ways. In these former
British colonies, race plays many of the same functions that class
plays in countries where capitalism arose out of feudalism. That is,
race – particularly for those of African descent in North America –
plays the “pedigree” function (remember the “one-drop” rule in the
US, that decreed that a person with a single drop of African blood
was black). It’s no accident, I think, that Marxism attracted some of
the brightest radical African American activists such as Angela Davis
and Cornel West, because of the close analogies between race and
class.24 While race and economic status are closely allied – darker-
skinned people make up a disproportionate part of the poor in the
US and Canada –, they’re not identical. The combination of racism,
sexism and capitalism in North America requires that radical politics
develop a different analysis of domination and liberation than Marxism
provides.
Marxism and other forms of socialism remain viable in most of
the rest of the world because Marxism speaks to the feudal past (or
present). Spain was still largely a feudal country when it colonized
the Americas, and so the Spanish conquistadores set up neo-feudal
colonies in the Americas. In Central and South America feudal sys-
tems are interlaced with complicated racial systems and some of the
greatest gaps between rich and poor in the world.25 Marxism remains
relevant because it addresses the concerns of a reified underclass that
cannot hope to attain political power or equality under current cir-
cumstances. In Africa, colonizers exploited existing feudal systems,
or fanned the flames of existing hostilities between different peoples
to set up neo-feudal systems (for example, the British systematical-
ly preferred the Tutsis over the Hutus in what is now Rwanda and
12
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Burundi). There too Marxism speaks to the lived experience of peo-
ple whose oppression is based on inherited characteristics, whether
natural or social.
Radical politics need a different theoretical foundation from
Marxism in at least the US and Canada. Such politics are being devel-
oped by theorists such as bell hooks, Michael Walzer and Catharine
MacKinnon, but they’re radical forms of liberalism.26 Now, I know
that Catharine MacKinnon would deny that she’s working within a
liberal framework, even a radical liberal framework.27 Feminism has
not created wholly new political forms of organizing and theorizing,
however. Instead, feminists in various countries work with and with-
in the existing political forms – which include both liberalism and
Marxism in much of the world, but mostly only liberalism in the US
and Canada. The radical forms of feminism, radical and socialist fem-
inism, have developed liberalism and Marxism, respectively, in novel
directions. For example, while MacKinnon’s work on equality has
developed the Anglo-American common-law tradition in radical direc-
tions, her analyses must be at least compatible with liberal legal and
political systems, or they would not have been adopted by American
courts in precedent-setting cases on sexual harassment, and by the
Canadian Supreme Court in its interpretation of s. 15, the equality
section, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.28
MacKinnon’s equality analysis is undoubtedly radical, but accepting
it requires a radical revision of liberal political and legal theories, not
an entirely new theory.
One final point: in my view, not only is radical feminism in the
US and Canada analogous to socialist feminism in western Europe,
but liberal feminism is analogous to what Jaggar calls classical Marxist
feminism.29 That is, we can think of a spectrum of feminisms with-
in both liberalism and Marxism, ranging from more mainstream views
(liberal and classical Marxist feminisms) to more radical views (rad-
ical and socialist feminisms). This allows us to explain why there’s
so much more second-wave radical and socialist feminist theory than
there is liberal and classical Marxist feminist theory. Liberal femi-
nism and classical Marxist feminism are simply liberalism and
Marxism applied to women. Most of the theoretical issues there
already have been worked out, in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies for liberalism, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries for Marxism. Radical and socialist feminisms, however,
make much deeper internal criticisms of liberalism and Marxism that
require developing the theories in new directions. Radical feminist
theory has developed from the early radical feminist claim “the per-
sonal is political” (that is, that personal life is politically structured),
and from Millett’s description of the relation between the sexes as
political.30 Thus the family and sexuality are sites of political conflict
for radical feminists; the liberal state must be convinced to foster, or
at least not hinder, radical feminist ends. New theory is necessary to
work out the implications of these radical feminist insights. Socialist
feminism has taken its own route. It has raised the Marxist category
of “reproduction” to a level equal with that of “production,” and it
has argued that Marxists must examine patriarchy alongside capital-
ism – that is, capitalist patriarchy, the particular form of patriarchy
that exists in the late industrial capitalist societies that followed feu-
dalism. Here too new theory must be developed to work out the impli-
cations of socialist feminists’ insights and to get the state to respond.
Mainstream liberal and classical Marxist feminists don’t need to write
theory, because most of the work already has been done. New fem-
inist theory is almost exclusively a radical project.
B. “DIFFERENCES”31
Here we focus on the differences and divisions between women
that exist in a given society. If the hegemonic “standard” in North
American feminism is a middle-class, white, heterosexual, able-bod-
ied, Anglophone Christian woman, then in this sub-category we get
feminisms from the Others: poor women, women of colour, lesbians/
bisexuals/ transgendered/ transsexual/ queer women, women with dis-
abilities, women from various ethnic and national groups32, and Jewish,
Muslim, Sikh and other women of faith. Here we have women who
have found it necessary to pose Sojourner Truth’s “ain’t I a woman?”
question to other feminists. The question addressed by “difference”
feminists is, how does male domination look from various Othered
perspectives within the dominant society, and how can these insights
be woven into feminist theory and practice? The standard tactic of
feminist editors has been to place at least feminists of colour at the
radical end of the political spectrum.33 But feminists of colour span
the range of mainstream-to-radical positions, just as white feminists
do.34 While in a sense it’s always politically radical to ask the “ain’t
I a woman?” question, this elides the differences between the posi-
tions of, say, Flo Kennedy (civil rights activist and feminist, a founder
13
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of the National Women’s Political Caucus and the Feminist Party in
the US) and bell hooks35, between Zora Neale Hurston and Toni
Morrison. This is equally true of the other Othered feminists, such
as lesbian feminists (Adrienne Rich and Judith Butler hardly share the
same position on the political spectrum36) and feminists with disabili-
ties (Susan Wendell and Shelley Tremain don’t have the same views
of disability issues37). It’s mindless to assume that every Othered fem-
inist is necessarily politically radical simply because she’s an Other.
Who counts as a Black/ lesbian/ Jewish etc. feminist? While at
first glance it might seem that these labels apply to individuals of a
socially denigrated race, sexuality, religion, etc., we get a very dif-
ferent picture if we apply the labels to feminist theories rather than
individuals. A theory is a set of beliefs and arguments supporting
those beliefs; a person does not have to possess any particular social
or natural characteristics, other than a minimal cognitive capacity, to
share those beliefs. Patricia Hill Collins argues in Black Feminist
Thought that, while Black women intellectuals must be the first to
articulate Black feminist principles, after the initial theory has been
laid out, anyone can accept and contribute to it: anyone, including
non-Blacks and non-women, can be a Black feminist. Collins acknowl-
edges the apparent cognitive dissonance involved in calling someone
who is not Black or female a Black feminist; she says bell hooks
suggests we avoid this awkwardness by “shifting from statements such
as ‘I am a feminist’ to those such as ‘I advocate feminism.’”38 (The
current term among activists today for a non-X who advocates an X
position is “ally.”)
“Differences” don’t clearly map onto a mainstream-to-radical or
right-to-left spectrum. A feminist might be mainstream or radical, and
also a feminist of colour, a feminist with a disability, a feminist of
faith, a queer feminist, a poor feminist, and/or a feminist of some
ethnic or nationalist stripe. Notice the “and” in the “and/or” of the
previous sentence. In the political spectrum category, each feminist
occupies a single point on the spectrum. She’s liberal, radical, clas-
sical Marxist or socialist – more mainstream or more radical; each
feminist occupies only one of these positions. In the “differences”
category, on the other hand, a feminist will occupy many different
positions. She’ll identify with one or more ethnicities or nationalities,
one or more “races” or colours, perhaps a faith (most faiths don’t
permit more than one identification), one or more dis/abilities, sex-
ualities, economic statuses and so on. The “differences” category is
multi-dimensional in a way that the political spectrum category sim-
ply is not. (We can think of “differences” as existing in n-dimension-
al space, where n is the number of “differences” that have achieved
theoretical voice in a particular country.)
There are, of course, feminists who don’t identify with one or
even any of these dimensions, particularly those who are on the more
privileged end of the scale. A white feminist may find her “race”
transparent to her,39 a heterosexual feminist may take her favoured
status for granted, an able-bodied feminist can fail to see the many
ways in which the world is constructed for those who are able-bod-
ied, a member of the ethnic and religious majority may not notice
that holidays and cultural patterns fit her ethnic and religious back-
ground, and so on. That’s because one of the greatest privileges is
not having to be aware of one’s social location with respect to a par-
ticular axis of discrimination; that lack of awareness frees up a great
deal of mental energy.
“Difference” feminist theorists have shown that male domination
(and dominance in general) is always multivalent – that is, male dom-
inance never exists on its own, but is always combined in a complex
chemistry with “race,” sexuality, ethnicity or nationality, abili-
ty/disability, etc. Kimberle Crenshaw calls this an “intersectional”
analysis, which discusses the complex ways that “differences” are
mutually constructing.40 Thus we can say that male domination is
always “raced,” has a sexuality, an ethnicity or nationality, an ability
or disability, a faith, and so on. “Difference” theorists have taught us
that “differences” always matter, and that they are always multifac-
eted.
Feminist theorists in the “differences” category have had profound
effects on feminist activism. Some feminist groups have organized
around a particular “difference” or set of “differences.” For example,
the Combahee River Collective, a group of Black lesbians active in
Boston in the 1970s, authored the widely-read and reprinted
“Combahee River Collective Statement”41 and worked on issues such
as reproductive choice, sterilization abuse and violence against
women, especially racialized violence. In Canada, the DisAbled
Women’s Network/ Réseau d’action des femmes handicapées writes
policy briefs, makes videos, educates and advocates for better lives
for women with disabilities.42 Feminist groups not specifically organ-
ized around “differences” have, to a greater or lesser extent, adopt-
ed the criticisms and analyses of “difference” feminists. For exam-
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ple, most violence against women organizations in Canada have adopt-
ed explicit anti-racism/ anti-oppression (AR/AO) principles in the last
few years, and have moved to make themselves accessible and friend-
ly to women who are doubly or multiply oppressed because they are
Native, women of colour, disabled, queer, immigrants and/or poor.
While feminist organizations’ implementation of AR/AO practices is
varied and imperfect, their practices are much more inclusive than
they were twenty or even ten years ago. The analyses of “difference”
feminists have been the impetus for this change.
Each “difference” is also both unique and analogous. That is,
while, for example, “race” or “sex” cannot be reduced to “class”
(despite the best efforts of some Marxist theorists), the categories do
share certain similarities. There’s a civil rights aspect to each of the
“differences,” a goal to end the subtle and not-so-subtle negative legal
and social distinctions attached to “difference.” In Canada, for exam-
ple, the federal government recognizes four “equality-seeking groups”:
women, members of visible minorities (the Canadian government’s
term for people of colour), Native people, and people with disabili-
ties. Members of those groups have convinced the majority of
Canadians (and thus the federal government) that their demands for
recognition and equality ought to be met.43 Many feminists consider
other groups to be equality-seeking as well: members of ethnic and
national groups, colonized people, lesbian/ gay/ bisexual/ transgen-
dered/ transsexual/ queer people, and so on. At minimum, these groups
advocate greater equality for women who are doubly or multiply
oppressed.
Despite a common commitment to equality, however, there’s still
significant diversity between the “differences.” No “difference” can
be reduced to another, and while there are analogies between the
forms of oppression and their remedies, each equality-seeking group
still needs distinct strategies for combatting inequality. For example,
Linda Martín Alcoff canvasses several feminist strategies and three
non-feminist strategies for dealing with white privilege in “What
Should White People Do?”44 While there are clear analogies between
white privilege and other forms of privilege, different strategies are
necessary to undermine each form of privilege. We might use the
“white awareness training” or “race traitor” models that Alcoff dis-
cusses as ways of thinking of male privilege, heterosexual privilege,
English language privilege or any other form of privilege, but they
must be adapted, not adopted without modification. The same can be
said for dealing with the various forms of domination. When bell
hooks invites everyone to love blackness in “Loving Blackness as
Political Resistance,”45 we can think about what it means to “love
femaleness,” “love Chineseness” or “love queerness,” but in each case
we must develop unique strategies for overcoming the social and cul-
tural derogation of each form of dominance.
“Differences” maps vary from country to country, because each
creates different Others. Ethnic groups and groups with national aspi-
rations will be included in some “differences” maps. For example,
Québecoise feminists in Canada have articulated a distinct feminist
voice; not only does language differ, but male domination looks dif-
ferent from a Québecoise position, given the dominance of
Anglophones and the existence of Québec as a distinct society with-
in Canada.46 The religions represented within feminism will vary, and
feminist faith positions will be articulated more or less fully within
a particular country. In principle, all religions should be represented
in a “differences” map of any country, because feminist perspectives
exist in all religions. In practice, however, only some religions will
be strong enough in a given country to have a distinct voice among
the feminist activists of that country. Jewish feminists in the US, for
example, have articulated a distinct feminist position47, whereas the
position of Hindu or Sikh feminists is less clearly articulated in the
North American context. The situation is different in India, which has
by far the largest feminist movement in the world, and is also one of
the most multicultural and multi-faith nations in the world; presum-
ably there Hindu and Sikh feminist positions are clearly articulated.
Othered races vary from country to country, and are constructed dif-
ferently in different countries. The Canadian government distinguish-
es Native people from people of colour; the South African apartheid
regime separated blacks from “coloured” people; in the UK, “black”
is used the way “people of colour” is used in the US. Indigenous
peoples may be the majority (Africa) or a small minority (Canada
and the US), and different situations will demand different feminist
responses. People of colour may have been transported unwillingly
(African slaves in the Americas), or may have come willingly (the
south Asian diaspora); different histories will require different forms
of feminism. Class matters more or less in different countries. It mat-
ters a great deal in Europe, and so working-class feminism has a dis-
tinct voice there, largely through Marxism. It matters rather less in
North America, so the literature is rather less.48 Finally, feminists with
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disabilities and lesbian/ bisexual/ transgendered/ transsexual/ queer
feminists may or may not have found their voices in some countries.
But every society has its dominant and Othered feminists, and this
sub-category represents their voices.
To represent the whole of feminist street theories, we must include
the voices of feminists who belong to dominant groups; they too
describe what male domination looks like from their perspectives.
Since their voices and perspectives tend to dominate, however, they’re
already well represented in the political spectrum category.
2. ACADEMIC THEORIES
We can distinguish feminist street theories from academic femi-
nist theories; the latter, like the former, is divided into two sub-cat-
egories. The first contains philosophical-theoretical positions that pro-
fessional feminist philosophers and feminist theorists from other dis-
ciplines have used to analyse women’s position, but that are general-
ly unconnected to movement activism; the second contains philosoph-
ical-theoretical work in which feminist analysis is applied to partic-
ular academic disciplines and sub-disciplines. I call the first sub-cat-
egory directly political analyses; it includes feminist theories such as
existentialist feminism, feminist phenomenology, psychoanalytic fem-
inism, feminist postmodernism and feminist political theory and phi-
losophy, which use philosophical-theoretical positions to analyse the
condition(s) of women. Simone de Beauvoir, Sandra Bartky, Juliet
Mitchell, Judith Butler and Susan Moller Okin, among others, have
shown us how fruitful this work can be.49 I call the second sub-cat-
egory indirectly political analyses; it includes feminist theoretical
approaches that apply feminist insights to issues within the tradition-
al academic disciplines, such as feminist ethics, feminist metaphysics
or feminist sociological theory. Virginia Held, Lorraine Code, Dorothy
Smith, Patricia Hill Collins and Gerda Lerner, among others, have
pioneered feminist perspectives within their disciplines.50
While of course all these positions are political – any feminist
position is necessarily political, including feminist history of philos-
ophy – they’re not directly connected with feminist activism. We don’t
see childcare collectives made up of existentialist feminists, pro-choice
rallies organized by psychoanalytic feminists, postmodern feminists
working for better working conditions for women in the sex trade.
Someone might challenge my separation of street theory from aca-
demic theories, and certainly I’m not trying to deny that feminists
with these positions have been and are activists, or even that their
philosophies inform their activism. (For example, existentialist femi-
nists have had strong ties to Marxism and feminist activism in Europe,
and of course both liberalism and Marxism are activist as well as
academic positions.) Rather, my claim is that these philosophies and
theories don’t inform the on-the-ground work and identities of the
vast majority of feminists. The writings of feminists on the political
spectrum and the work of “difference” feminists, on the other hand,
have a significant influence on feminist identities and activism. (In
my experience, radical, socialist and “differences” feminists read a
lot of feminist street theory.51 Classical Marxist feminists tend to stick
largely to works by Marx and Engels, while liberal feminists tend not
to read theory.)
I don’t mean to imply that academic feminist theories won’t affect
activism in the future, however. Christine de Pizan argued for the
equal dignity and worth of women centuries before there was an
organized feminist movement. Mary Wollstonecraft’s ideas had virtu-
ally no impact in her time, but in the long run they were revolution-
ary. Simone de Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex nearly two decades
before the second wave of feminism, but there’s no doubt that her
analysis contributed to the re-birth of a large-scale feminist move-
ment. Some feminist academic theories may become more widely
influential in the future (most feminists are social constructivists with-
out knowing anything about social constructivism as a theory, and
many “difference” feminists owe a significant debt to postmodernism).
The activist-academic distinction is perhaps analogous to the pure-
applied distinction in the sciences: applied sciences such as engineer-
ing change the world, but without pure science the applied sciences
would stagnate. Similarly, feminists use street theories in their daily
lives, but academic theories provide impetus for new feminist theo-
rizing. Pure science and academic feminist theories are also worth
pursuing for their own sakes, as is philosophy; knowledge has intrin-
sic as well as instrumental value.
3. CONCLUSIONS
In Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Jaggar specifically rejects
the view that her work classifies feminist positions. She writes, “In
my analysis of feminist theory, I am not interested in a taxonomic
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classification of as many subspecies as possible. Rather, I seek a
sound methodology to provide the basis for a theory and practice that
will liberate women.”52 But isn’t “taxonomic classification” just what
I’ve done here? What difference does my classification make to fem-
inist theories? My answer here is divided into three parts: the polit-
ical spectra, street theory in general, and academic feminist theories.
A. LIBERAL, RADICAL, MARXIST AND SOCIALIST
FEMINISMS
First, I’ve explained why no one calls herself a radical feminist
outside of North America and why only a very few people call them-
selves socialist feminists within North America. Radical feminism is
a peculiarly North American phenomenon, a radical but not (neces-
sarily) socialist version of feminism. Almost everywhere else in the
world to be a radical is to be a socialist, so feminists who are radi-
cal outside of North America just look like socialist feminists to us;
and since radical feminism is so strongly associated with American
feminism, feminists who are radical outside of North America don’t
call themselves radical feminists. Socialist feminism is rare within
North America for the same reasons that socialism is – because, for
complicated historical reasons, Marxism (the most common form of
socialism, at least prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union) does not
speak to the experiences of most North Americans.
Second, I’ve argued that liberal and classical Marxist feminisms
are analogous, as are radical and socialist feminisms. Liberal and clas-
sical Marxist feminists accept the basic tenets of their respective the-
ories, but think the theories haven’t been applied correctly to women.
While liberalism and Marxism did require modifications to include
women, most of that theoretical work was done in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. As a result, contemporary liberal and Marxist
feminists don’t tend to write theory. Radical and socialist feminists,
on the other hand, believe that both society and the background
political theories – liberalism and socialism, respectively – require
radical revision to accommodate women as women, rather than as
men in drag. Since much theoretical work remains to be done, rad-
ical and socialist feminists have produced the bulk of contemporary
feminist theory.
Third, one of my more controversial claims is that radical femi-
nism is a radically egalitarian version of liberalism. Here I’m using
liberalism in its political-philosophical sense, as a political theory in
which all people are assumed to be free and equal, not in the pejo-
rative sense often used by radicals, in which liberals are considered
to be people who want the world to be fairer, as long as it doesn’t
cost them anything or make them uncomfortable. If radical feminists
aren’t liberals in the political-philosophical sense, though, we need to
ask what political theory radical feminism falls under. Clearly not
Marxism, and it doesn’t fit any other version of socialism. Nor (with
the exception of MacKinnon) have radical feminists claimed to be
producing a wholly new form of political theory.
What else could ground it? We might see radical feminism as a
radical version of deliberative democracy, or as a radical form of
democracy such as participatory democracy. Democratic theory is only
a partial political theory, however. There are places where it clearly
doesn’t apply (the family, hospitals, firefighting), there are things the
state should guarantee regardless of public opinion (public education,
civil and political rights, workplace and highway safety laws), there
are other things the state should forbid regardless of public opinion
(the tyranny of the majority, hate crimes), and there are decisions that
a democratic people ought not to be allowed to make (invading anoth-
er country without provocation, polluting the oceans). Democratic the-
ory needs to be supplemented with other theoretical premises to
become a whole political theory – which brings us back to liberal-
ism, Marxism or some other political theory. Radical feminist criti-
cisms and goals assume a pretty thick base of liberal commitments,
in my view. When we argue that many things we perceive as “natur-
al” (such as gender roles and preferences) are in fact socially con-
structed, that “women’s work” really is work, that rape is an assault
in which sex is used as the weapon, we’re basing our claims on the
equal humanity of women, on the value of women’s work and on our
rights to the equal protection and benefit of the law. Nussbaum says
these are Kantian liberal claims;53 while I think a Millian liberal would
agree, they’re still liberal claims. They require that we radically revise
liberalism (by, for example, re-thinking what we mean by “private”),
but not that we wholly reject it.
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B. POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND “DIFFERENCES”
On my classification, political spectrum and “differences” femi-
nisms are all street theories. However, I’ve removed “differences” fem-
inisms from the political spectrum category and placed them in a cat-
egory of their own. The analyses of “difference” feminists range across
the political spectrum in much the same way that the analyses of
feminists from dominant groups do – their views are mainstream or
radical, and they’re grounded in liberalism, Marxism or some other
political theory. My view differs from the view expressed by Jaggar
and Rothenberg in Feminist Frameworks. They claim that liberal, clas-
sical Marxist, radical, socialist and multicultural feminisms view the
subordination of women through different “lenses”: liberal feminism
through the lens of gender, classical Marxist feminism through the
lens of class, radical feminism through the lenses of sex, gender and
sexuality, socialist feminism through the lenses of gender and class,
and multicultural feminism through the lenses of race, gender, class
and sexuality. I think this view is doubly wrong. First, it puts multi-
cultural feminism at the most inclusive end of feminist theories. While
in general “difference” feminists are more likely to include other “dif-
ference” analyses in their work, this isn’t necessarily true of them all.
“Difference” feminists too make mistakes and omissions. They’re
sometimes racist, ableist, heterosexist or culturally imperialist. One
of the most striking characteristics of theories by most American fem-
inists, including “difference” feminists, is how very American they
are, how they assume that their particular experiences as Other are
universally shared. Second, Jaggar and Rothenberg’s view implies that
feminist theories can be placed along a spectrum, ranging from the
most conservative (liberal feminism) to the most radical (multicultur-
al feminism). But multicultural feminists span roughly the same main-
stream-to-radical spectrum that feminists from dominant groups do;
some of them identify with the Combahee River Collective or the
Lesbian Mothers’ Defence Fund, but some of them identify with the
National Action Committee on the Status of Women or the National
Organization for Women.
My classification includes “difference” feminist theories as street
theories, but places them in a separate group. The analyses of “dif-
ference” feminists have had a significant impact on feminist theories
and practices, but that impact doesn’t translate into traditional left-
centre-right or liberal-socialist distinctions. “Difference” feminist
theorists have made feminist analyses more inclusive without making
them more left-wing or socialist.
C. ACADEMIC FEMINIST THEORIES
Finally, my analysis includes many important feminist perspec-
tives that Jaggar excludes, but that other feminist theorists and philoso-
phers have included in their discussions.54 While I agree with Jaggar
that academic feminist theories are unlikely to provide road maps for
the liberation of women, they still provide important insights into
women’s condition, women’s contributions to history and theory, the
ways we’ve been excluded from history and theory, and the theories
that have been used to keep us in subjection.
My analysis of feminist theories allows us to see how a feminist
theorist can be politically moderate or radical, at the same time that
s/he is both a member of any number of equality-seeking groups
besides women and a practitioner of one or more academic methods.
I’ve suggested that we classify feminist theories into two general cat-
egories, street theories and academic theories, and four sub-categories.
Jaggar’s view leaves some things unexplained, and the multiplication
of feminist political perspectives has only clouded the issue. I hope
in this paper to have brought some clarity to the various forms of
feminism.
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